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tarting with the issue of the Taliban, Mike Schmitt continues to be trou-
bled about the legality of using force against the Taliban. I began at this
position also. Indeed, at one point I authored an opinion for an editorial page
stating that if the Taliban resisted when the United States used force against
al Qaeda, it would be legally permissible to use force against the Taliban. Sub-
sequently, I have re-thought this view and I now think the appropriate way to
deal with this issue is to recognize that the Taliban was not in fact either de jure
or de facto the lawful government of Afghanistan.
To begin with, at the height of the “Taliban Regime,” only three countries
in the world, Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates, and Pakistan, conducted
diplomatic relations with the Taliban. This means that 189 countries did not.
When the UN Security Council ordered countries to either break relations
with the Taliban or not to have dealings with the Taliban, the number of
states with diplomatic relations with the Taliban became one, Pakistan. As an
aside, I believe that Pakistan was probably encouraged by a number of states to
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retain such a relationship with the Taliban in order to have a state capable of
communicating demands to the Taliban. However, almost all states that com-
prise the world community did not recognize the Taliban as the government
of a sovereign state. Moreover, at the time the United States initiated the use
of military force against the Taliban, the UN Security Council, on behalf of
the international community, had taken the position that the Taliban did not
comprise the government of a state. In fact, the Security Council consistently
has referred to them as the “faction in Afghanistan known as the Taliban” so
as to ensure there is a clear international understanding that the Taliban do
not comprise the recognized government of the country of Afghanistan.2
The easiest way then, to resolve the issue of whether the Taliban was the
recognized government of Afghanistan or not is to conclude that the Taliban
was a religious force that had seized control over substantial parts of Afghani-
stan and was trying to enforce its moral rules upon the people. I do not believe
that the Taliban viewed itself as the government of Afghanistan. My strong
guess is that military leaders of the Taliban militia did not hold commissions
issued in the name of the government of Afghanistan nor did they think of
themselves as the armed forces of Afghanistan but rather as the enforcement
arm of a religious organization or entity. Before Operation ENDURING FREE-
DOM began, I do not think the United States government, its citizens, or the
citizens of Afghanistan perceived that the United States was going to war with
Afghanistan. I think the perception and the reality were that the United
States was using force inside Afghanistan to bring to an end a very abusive, il-
legitimate, totalitarian regime, controlling the people of that country. The
United States was liberating the people of Afghanistan not oppressing them.
On a related note, an argument exists based on humanitarian intervention
grounds for the US intervention in Afghanistan. After all, if one takes the po-
sition that international law makes it unlawful for sovereign states to inter-
vene to prevent the genocide in World War II or the slaughter of two-million
Cambodians, then international law itself has become part of the problem, not
the solution. Indeed my friend Rudy Rummel in his book Death by Government
points out that during the 20th century, probably three to four times more
people were slaughtered by their own governments than died in hostilities
throughout the entire century.3
Now let me raise a trivial point and one I have previously discussed with
Professor Schmitt. Mike refers to the September 11th attacks as “causing
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2. See, e.g., S. C. Res. 1193 U.N. SCOR, 53d Sess., U.N. Doc. S/1193/(1998), para. 7.
3. RUDY RUMMELL, DEATH BY GOVERNMENT (1994).
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property and financial damage measuring in the hundreds of millions of dol-
lars.” The reality is that this cost must be in the many billions of dollars.
Counting only the value of the human lives lost in the attack on the World
Trade Center, the cost would surely be in the billions of dollars. This is to say
nothing of the incredible clean-up efforts currently underway or the impact of
the attacks on financial institutions throughout the world. Added to this, of
course, are the countless costs such as the lost time of business executives to
airport security, the cost of strengthening cockpit doors, the loss to the airline
industry.
These costs are only financial in nature though. How much more difficult
to attempt to quantify the emotional costs in fear, anger and grief? I recently
lectured on terrorism at the Naval Justice School, and my son came with me.
During my presentation, my nine-year-old son drew a picture of the World
Trade Center with some very poignant words about terrorism. This type of
emotional cost cannot be measured in dollars but it is nonetheless tremen-
dous. When all of these costs are quantified, we may well be talking in the tril-
lions of dollars.
More substantively, I have a nuanced difference with Mike Schmitt regard-
ing the definition of what an “armed attack” truly is. I think Professor Schmitt
is taking a literalist approach to the UN Charter regarding the definition of an
armed attack. It is true that Article 51 refers to the inherent right of self de-
fense if an armed attack occurs against a member of the United Nations.4
However, Professor Schmitt also makes the point that only members of the
United Nations are cloaked with the inherent right of self-defense pursuant to
Article 51. While perhaps true with respect to Article 51 in the literal sense,
this is false in reality inasmuch as the inherent right to self-defense is a corner-
stone of customary international law. As an example, when non-UN member
North Korea invaded non-UN member South Korea, the United Nations Se-
curity Council acted and authorized the use of force in collective self-defense.
Clearly, South Korea had this right before the action of the Security Coun-
cil. Undoubtedly, the prohibition on the use of aggressive force contained in
Article 2(4) of the UN Charter is binding but the more important point is
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that Article 51 of the Charter does not create the right of self-defense.5 While
Article 51 was one of the most important parts of the charter, it was also an
afterthought.
The prohibition against the aggressive use of force is embodied in Article
2(4) of the UN Charter. With the conclusion of the Act of Chapultepec in
19456 which embodied the principle of collective self-defense, the United
States and its Latin American neighbors wanted the UN Charter to clearly
state that if the Security Council was blocked from taking action by a veto or
some other reason, the traditional right of collective self-defense as embodied
in the Act of Chapultepec remained unimpaired and available. This was the
ultimate purpose of Article 51 of the United Nations Charter.
Although the drafters of the UN Charter had in mind World War I and
World War II, the French version of Article 51 uses the term armed aggres-
sion and not armed attack and I believe this to be the more appropriate focus
of Article 51. The question is whether there is a wrongful act involving the use
of lethal force that creates a right to use force in self-defense. Mind you, the
proportionality doctrine applies in this analysis and a small incursion will not
authorize a nuclear response or any disproportional response.
This view is quite clearly supported by a review of the notes exchanged at
the time of the Kellogg Briand Pact of 1928. Prior to entry into force of this
Pact, a number of countries were prepared to include reservations to their rati-
fication reserving the right to self-defense. The US response was to send out a
diplomatic note saying the right to self-defense is imprescriptable. This right
pre-exists treaties, is inherent in treaties, and cannot be taken away, even by
treaty. Interestingly, the Russian text of Article 51 also does not refer to the
inherent right of individual or collective self-defense but instead to the
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5. In 1928, Secretary of State Frank Kellogg stated “that right is inherent in every state and is
implicit in each treaty. Every nation is free at all times and regardless of treaty provisions to
defend its territory from invasion and it alone is competent to decide whether circumstance
require recourse to war in self-defense.” Frank B. Kellogg, Address Before the American Society
of International Law (Apr. 28, 1928) in 22 PROC AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. 141, 143 (1928). This
quote constituted official US recognition at the time that the right of self-defense cannot be
restricted by treaty.
6. Inter-American Reciprocal Treaty of Assistance and Solidarity (Act of Chapultepec,
Mexico); March 6, 1945 This act provided:
[t]hat every attack of a State against the integrity or the inviolability of the territory, or
against the sovereignty or political independence of an American State, shall,
conformably to Part III hereof, be considered as an act of aggression against the other
States which sign this Act. In any case invasion by armed forces of one State into the
territory of another trespassing boundaries established by treaty and demarcated in
accordance therewith shall constitute an act of aggression.
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imprescriptable right of individual or collective self-defense. Thus, given the
US position and indeed that of the nations that became signatories to the
Kellogg Briand Pact, the individual and collective right to self-defense is in-
deed imprescriptable.
So, to state that after entry into effect of the UN Charter, self-defense is
only permissible in response to an armed attack, misses the point that lethal
force continues to be available to states, members and non-members, in self-
defense and in collective self-defense supporting the victims of aggression of
the illegal use of lethal force by other states. Accordingly, I do not believe the
standard to invoke either self-defense or collective self-defense to be quite as
difficult to achieve as perhaps Professor Schmitt indicates.
Additionally, I believe that the International Court of Justice in the Military
and Paramilitary Activities Case In and Against Nicaragua7 quite simply, reached
the wrong conclusion. This case had more political involvement than most
cases and in my view does not reflect the law. Although Article 59 of the Stat-
ute of the ICJ provides that ICJ decisions have “no binding force except be-
tween the parties and in respect to that particular case,”8 such decisions are
often very useful for international lawyers trying to understand the developing
law. However, with the exception of the brilliant dissent authored by Judge
Schwabel, the ICJ decision in the Nicaragua Case is mostly cited in disagree-
ment. In my opinion, this particular case has absolutely no precedential value.
The Caroline Case I think is better viewed as a description of anticipatory
self defense than of self defense.9 Others may disagree but if you really look at
the facts, the steamboat was being fitted out with the intention of providing
support to rebels in Canada. The British crossed the Canadian-US border, set
the Caroline afire, cut it adrift, and apparently not realizing there were people
onboard sent it over the falls. I think the Caroline Case may be too strong a
test for self-defense. Regardless of which term is used, there ought to be an
overwhelming presumption against the legality of initiating force prior to an
attack by another country. But, particularly in an environment of weapons of
mass destruction, the idea that the law ought to say a Saddam Hussein gets
one more free kick before a state can defend itself strikes me as not very well
thought out.
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7. Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. US), Merits,
1986 I.C.J. 14 [hereinafter Nicaragua Case].
8. Article 59, states: The decision of the Court has no binding force except between the parties
and in respect of that particular case. I.C.J. Statute, Article 59.
9. See R.Y. Jennings, The Caroline and McLeod Cases, 32 AM. J. INT’L L. 82 (1938).
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On a related note, Professor Schmitt seemed to struggle a bit with justifica-
tion for the attacks on the al Qaeda terrorist group. This is so because Article
2(4) of the UN Charter only talks about states. This seems to be a somewhat
easier problem to resolve though. The Charter is designed to primarily defend
the rights of states although it also set the stage for a tremendous growth of in-
ternational humanitarian law involving individuals. I think the best view is
that terrorists such as al Qaeda members are just like pirates in the sense that
they are the common enemy of mankind. I think this should be the official US
position, that terrorists occupy the same legal status as pirate. Note that this
does not mean that terrorists are not protected by international law. Just as
you cannot murder pirates, you cannot murder, maim, or torture terrorists.
Both of these groups are entitled to some fundamental due process protections
once they have either surrendered or are under your control. However, as long
as they continue to engage in piracy or ongoing acts of terrorism, they are law-
ful targets.
With respect to Rein Müllerson’s paper, his notion that the UN Charter
continues to be updated by evolving customary international law makes great
sense. I also share his view that al Qaeda is more the marionette than the
Taliban. Professor Müllerson’s comments on post-modern societies in Europe
and the tension created between post-modern European societies and the still
modern society of the United States were also quite intriguing. The tension
between these two models presents serious problems.
Sun Tzu teaches us that the acme of skill is not to win one hundred victo-
ries and one hundred battles but to subdue the enemy without fighting.10 The
best way to do that with thugs such as Osama bin Laden and Saddam Hussein
is to demonstrate to them that the perceived benefits of their behavior are
greatly outweighed by the perceived cost. To do this, the world must unite
against them.
We had to use force in 1991, but at that point we reestablished the credibil-
ity of the world community through the Security Council. Sadly, since then,
we have largely frittered away that credibility in a variety of rather tragic inci-
dents. At least prior to 9/11, we missed several opportunities to respond firmly
to threats to the peace and particularly the problem of terrorism. And sadly,
time is not on the side of the United States nor the other peace loving coun-
tries. In this era of weapons of mass destruction, this ostrich-like idea that the
United States should not do anything until Saddam Hussein obtains weapons
of mass destruction and delivery systems is fatally flawed. Should the United
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10. SUN TZU, THE ART OF WAR (Samuel Griffith trans., 1963).
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States really wait to act until after Saddam Hussein blows up his neighbors or
destroys Israel? This approach is not helpful to the cause of peace.
I do not share Professor Mike Glennon’s view that there is no coherent in-
ternational law regarding the intervention of states. The basic prohibition
against the aggressive use of force by states is well understood. As an example,
even before the United Nations Charter, when Adolf Hitler invaded Poland,
he claimed he was defending Germany from Poland. This was a lie but why did
Hitler bother to lie? Hitler understood that, by itself, aggression was unlawful
and that the world community viewed aggression as unlawful. Similarly, when
Kim Il Sung invaded South Korea in 1950, he claimed that North Korea was
simply defending itself against attacks by South Korea. This too was a lie.
These two events highlight the reality that even the worst tyrants understand
that it is illegal to engage in major acts of aggression. They mask it.
When the Sandinistas attempted to overthrow the government of El Salva-
dor, they did a brilliant job of turning the world against the defensive response
of the United States. But they did not come out and claim a right to overthrow
the government of El Salvador. They did it in secret because they knew to do
so was unlawful. If you read the American and Nicaraguan briefs before the
world court, it would be hard to distinguish them. They basically gave the
same summary of the law.11 And each party charged the other with providing
money, support and advice and said this is illegal. The question dealt with
whether the US involvement was a defensive response, or was it an act of ag-
gression directed against Nicaragua? I think the evidence now clearly shows it
was a defensive response.
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